Our 'Pre-War' Situation Today

From OpenArt

British military commentators and some politicians state that we are in a ‘pre-war’ situation today, referencing Russia and China.

We need to revitalise our military, which is undermanned and underequipped (true). We need deeper roots for military culture within our society, to be facilitated by a trained civilian reserve force.

But what is really motivating our presumed adversaries? 

Let me quote from Jack Watling’s book, “The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century” chapter 13.

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“For Vladimir Putin – prior to the invasion of 24 February – Ukraine was understood to be a recalcitrant Russian province. He believed there was widespread sympathy for Russia in the country. He also believed that a fait accompli seizing a limited number of key objectives in a matter of days would bring about the collapse of wider resistance, and the unwillingness of the West to intervene or oppose the seizure. The Russians intervened without mobilising, and assessed – incorrectly – that the localised correlation of forces was favourable. In short, Russia did not conduct the operation based on an assessment of Ukraine’s aggregate combat power augmented with Western support, but rather based on its belief that it could achieve a rapid and localised victory.

"China similarly views Taiwan as a province of China and its military activities, from the setting up of bastions in the South China Sea on reclaimed atolls to its long-range strike capabilities, are clearly intended to enable the isolation of Taiwan to achieve a rapid limited seizure. It anticipates a ‘local war under informatised conditions’ using long-range precision strike and nuclear threats to deter broader escalation.”

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The set of countries the Russian leadership takes to be “recalcitrant provinces” (the Baltic states? Poland?) seems unlikely to include Western Europe, however. And all the more so for China.

So we are talking more about preserving the boundaries of the Western sphere of influence (and of course the congenial freedoms of people within this space) rather than an existential threat to our own way of life in the UK.

This surely explains the reluctance of the British state (even more so the western states of the EU) to spend real money and expend political capital on defence.

For what it's worth I am not fond of a future dominated by the arrogant and domineering states of Russia and China. Nor do I approve of incorporating people by force into unpleasant regimes. I would thoroughly support an enhanced British military with broad civil society roots.

You might say: who is really interested in the destruction and human suffering of war? But of course, Leon Trotsky was right.

"The Arms of the Future" - Jack Watling (review)

 

I asked Gemini to summarise this review from Frank Hoffman, which is quite long, into something more succinct:

"Jack Watling's book, "The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century," tackles a critical question: how should armies adapt to the changing face of war?  Warfare is becoming more lethal, with new drone technologies and a renewed focus on urban combat.  Watling argues that armies are not keeping pace, clinging to outdated structures and simply adding new tech on top.

The book proposes a complete overhaul of force design.  Part 1 dives into the future battlefield, analyzing  increased transparency due to sensor technology, the limitations of armor in the face of rising lethality, and the enduring challenges of urban warfare.

Part 2 gets practical, outlining a new force structure with four key subsystems: maneuver, fires, assault, and support.  This new design emphasizes dispersed formations for better survivability, increased lethality to counter enemy firepower, and the ability to adapt to the unique demands of urban combat.  It also integrates drones more seamlessly and calls for lighter, more agile armored vehicles.

Importantly, Watling doesn't advocate abandoning traditional maneuver tactics.  He acknowledges the role of armor but emphasizes overcoming its limitations through clever tactics that create ambiguity and deception.

"The Arms of the Future" is a well-researched book that draws on real-world conflicts and the insights of military experts.  While it doesn't delve into unconventional warfare or address the specific needs of special operations forces, it offers a wealth of practical solutions and raises important questions about how armies should be structured for the future battlefield.  This book is a must-read for policymakers and military personnel serious about adapting to the ever-changing nature of war. It provides a strong foundation for further discussion and experimentation on how to build a military that can thrive in the coming decades."

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I would add: the book is undeniably important. Its focus on military architecture and logistics shows a deep comprehension for the realities of sustainable warfighting. However, it is written for military strategy professionals: jargon-rich and abstract in tone. It requires sustained attention.

My concern is that it captures a moment in time, where robotic/autonomous sensor/effector systems and AI synthesis/analysis systems have capabilities impossible to ignore, but not at capability to replace trained soldiers in any current department of warfare. 

But progress is exceptionally rapid: what will the situation look like in five or ten years time?

The problem is that re-engineering a major power's military is a generational process, measured in decades. It seems clear that the journey Watling has charted must be followed, but substantial course corrections seem likely within successive five year windows. 

Will military bureaucracies be up for the challenge, not just of change but of changing change?