Free Will and the Laws of Physics

From ChatGPT

I remember it being a shock to me when I first realised that, if the laws of physics apply to human beings, then there is no possibility of genuine free will. After all, if every event in the universe, including human actions, is determined by preceding physical states governed by the laws of nature, it seems that every decision we make is the inevitable outcome of prior causes. This thought left me wondering how, under such conditions, we could possibly have free will or be morally responsible for our actions.

However, some philosophers propose a way to reconcile these two concepts through what is known as compatibilism. Compatibilism suggests that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Even if our actions are determined by physical laws, we can still act freely if our actions are aligned with our desires, intentions, and rational deliberation. In this view, as long as our actions reflect our internal states and are not coerced, we can be said to have free will, even within a deterministic framework. This allows for the preservation of moral agency, as people can still be held accountable for their actions if those actions arise from their character and intentions.

Others, however, argue from a different perspective known as libertarianism. In this context, libertarianism refers to the idea that free will exists and is fundamentally incompatible with determinism. According to this view, not all events are determined by physical laws; human decisions, in particular, are seen as the result of a non-physical "will" that allows for genuine choice. From this standpoint, individuals are truly morally responsible for their actions because they could have acted differently in the same situation, allowing for a robust sense of moral agency and accountability. 

This, however, gratuitously violates the laws of physics.

On the other hand, some adopt the position of hard determinism, which accepts that determinism is true and, consequently, free will does not exist. Hard determinists argue that since every action is the result of preceding physical events, people do not possess free will in the true sense. This raises significant challenges for our understanding of moral responsibility. If individuals do not have free will, it becomes difficult to justify holding them morally accountable for their actions. In response, some hard determinists advocate for a rethinking of moral concepts, emphasising rehabilitation over punishment, or focusing on social and psychological factors in evaluating behaviour. 

In refutation, it is sufficient to observe that free will exists in virtue of the fact that people believe it does, and socially make use of the concept without there being any alternative. Socially-defined entities do, in fact, exist.

Interestingly, developments in quantum mechanics have introduced a new dimension to this debate. Some interpretations suggest that at the microscopic level, not all events are determined, and there is an element of randomness or indeterminacy. This has led some philosophers and scientists to speculate that quantum indeterminacy could provide a basis for free will. If human decisions are influenced by indeterminate quantum events, then our actions might not be fully determined by prior states. However, this introduces the challenge of randomness into the concept of free will, as it is unclear how random quantum events could give rise to meaningful control over one’s actions, which is essential for moral responsibility. 

Utterly unconvincing.

Another perspective comes from emergentism, the idea that complex systems, such as human consciousness and decision-making, can give rise to properties that are not reducible to their constituent parts. From this viewpoint, while humans are composed of particles that obey the laws of physics, consciousness and free will might emerge as real phenomena from the complex interactions within the brain. This allows for the coexistence of physical determinism and genuine moral responsibility, suggesting that free will and moral agency are emergent properties of our physical nature. 

However, this smuggles in an illegitimate, almost magical, anti-reductionism.

I think I am a compatibilist. Treating people as moral agents is an instance of the ‘Intentional Stance’. Operationally it functions as a means of social control and cohesion, without each of us having to model/manipulate internal brain states of others at a causal, neuron-synapse level - which, in any case, is utterly impractical in the foreseeable future. Psychologically, however, our sense of moral agency is not solely instrumental; instead it is part of consciousness: our sense of ourselves and others as persons, not things.

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Note: Apart from the last para and comments, this post was drafted by ChatGPT. See also Molinism/Thomism.