Wednesday, November 18, 2026

It's unlikely that All Things are Full of Gods

Amazon

"David Bentley Hart’s unprecedented exploration of the mystery of consciousness. Writing in the form of a Platonic dialogue, he systematically subjects the mechanical view of nature that has prevailed in Western culture for four centuries to dialectical interrogation. Powerfully rehabilitating a classical view in which mental acts are irreducible to material causes, he argues through the gods’ exchanges that the foundation of all reality is spiritual or mental rather than material. The structures of mind, organic life, and even language together attest to an infinite act of intelligence in all things that we may as well call God." - From the Amazon blurb


I bought All Things Are Full of Gods by David Bentley Hart because its subject matter seemed to cover most of the issues people worry about when trying to understand consciousness. The author also seemed to have sufficient renown to have been the subject of a Conversation with Tyler Cowen, which suggested a certain intellectual standing.

Furthermore, the book appeared to offer a critique of mechanistic, materialist or functionalist theories of consciousness, which is obviously interesting given that nobody seems able to lay a hand on the Hard Problem, as David Chalmers described it, from a materialist point of view (although there is much hand-waving).

Sadly, this book is itself full of hand-waving. From the self-indulgence of its structure as a dialogue between Greek gods (which seems mostly an excuse to put a winsome nymph on the front cover, as shown above) through to its mode of argumentation, which consists largely of Gods asserting things the author himself wants to believe, without providing any compelling reason why anybody else should believe them.

For example, Hart repeatedly treats purported explanatory gaps between material processes and mental phenomena as demonstrations of logical impossibility. But an explanatory gap, however profound, is not itself a proof of ontological discontinuity.

Many things we can see and do today would have been inconceivable to earlier generations, who lacked the conceptual apparatus to engage with them. Software, for example.

Behind its being arrogant, under-argued and altogether too pleased with itself, the book is essentially an attempt to promote a Neoplatonist, Christian view of consciousness.

Hart's presentation of the topic disappointingly headlines a distorted conception of consciousness, one which is more cognitive and awareness-centric than concerned with phenomenal qualities such as pain, pleasure, colour experience and the emotional salience of experience. These are mentioned, certainly, but are hardly central to Hart's preoccupations. The goalposts are shifted without much justification, conveniently evading some of the harder and more intellectually challenging ontological problems of consciousness.

I came to the sense that Hart was somebody who had read a great deal, mostly in areas that particularly interested him, and had vaguely absorbed some ideas from advanced science, whether quantum theory or relativity theory, at something like a popular-science level, though without really understanding the relationship between the advanced mathematics of these foundational theories and the ontological claims their mathematical structures might actually support about reality.

I didn't see much insight there.

The book. I concluded, was wide rather than deep. Hart had a great deal to say about those materialist theories with which he disagreed (at turgid length but not very convincingly) but remarkably little to say about what he would replace them with, apart from the same sort of hand-waving he otherwise deprecates.

It's very hard to read. The style is dry, repetitive, irritatingly assertive and not at all engaging. One almost pleads for a large language model to compress the whole thing into a couple of pages rather than the hundreds of pages through which the reader is obliged to struggle.

There are, moreover, highly salient problems of consciousness which Hart never really engages with. Consider, for example, our everyday experience of living in the world with other people.

All the data underlying our perceptions of reality 'out there' arrives through sensory organs that provide remarkably low-bandwidth and lossy channels of information. These inputs then drive world-building synthesis through enormously complicated, biologically-evolved neural structures, such as the visual cortex and corresponding structures for other senses, together with contextual integration mechanisms within the (unconscious) brain. 

And so, finally, to consciousness: it's all a long way from a blank slate.

From impoverished input, our brains somehow construct an extraordinarily rich model of perceived reality, which we experience as entirely transparent: the world simply appears to be there: objective and immediately present to hand. Yet this experience is something the brain has cooked up.

It's a sobering thought that when you look upon a loved one, every aspect of what you consciously see, hear, feel, remember and anticipate is a construct generated through unconscious neural processes. That they really exist as you think them to be is an inference extending beyond the evidence immediately available to consciousness

Not really an insight we can live by.

But any theory which ignores this extraordinary truth is scarcely going to engage the problems of consciousness.

These are difficult ideas to internalise precisely because they fly in the face of our everyday intuitions; indeed they are rather frightening. Hart barely begins to address them.

Eventually in relief I abandoned this glittering literary desert.


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