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| From ChatGPT |
Compatibilist Molinism: a new approach to TheodicyIntroduction
How can you combine the concept of an omniscient and omnipotent deity with human free-will and therefore the possibility to do evil? For many centuries, Molinism was probably the best theoretical framework. But in a twenty-first century world where all observable phenomena have been found consistent with the laws of physics, and we now understand agency through the paradigm of the ‘Intentional Stance’, we can do much, much better. ChatGPT has summarised our lengthy discussion on these topics in the following conceptual essay.
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Note: Theodicy specifically refers to the attempt to justify the goodness and omnipotence of God in the face of the existence of evil and suffering in the world. It deals with questions about why a good and all-powerful God would permit evil and suffering to exist.
Reframing Molinism within a Compatibilist Framework: An Essay on Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom
Molinism, a theological system developed by the 16th-century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, attempts to reconcile divine omniscience and omnipotence with human free will. Central to Molinism is the concept of "middle knowledge" — the idea that God possesses knowledge of what any free creature would do under any possible set of circumstances. This knowledge allows God to actualize a world that aligns with His divine purposes while preserving human freedom. However, this framework traditionally assumes a libertarian view of free will, where agents possess the genuine ability to choose between alternatives in a way that is not determined by prior causes.
Critics from a Compatibilist perspective argue that this libertarian assumption is problematic. Compatibilism posits that free will is compatible with determinism: the view that every event, including human actions, is determined by preceding causes in accordance with the laws of nature. In a determined world, the notion of free choices that could have been otherwise in a metaphysically indeterminate sense seems illusory. If every choice is the result of prior states and causal processes, the idea of "middle knowledge" as traditionally understood loses coherence. However, this essay argues that Molinism can be reframed within a Compatibilist framework, preserving its core theological insights while aligning with a determinist (modulo Schrödinger's equation with the MWI) understanding of the world. This reframing involves interpreting God’s middle knowledge, not as knowledge of undetermined free choices, but as knowledge of determined actions understood through the lens of the intentional stance, a concept introduced by philosopher Daniel Dennett.
Compatibilism, the Intentional Stance, and Free Will
To understand how Molinism can be reconciled with Compatibilism, it is essential first to outline the key concepts at play. Compatibilism is the philosophical position that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. According to this view, human beings can be free and morally responsible for their actions even if those actions are determined by prior causes. The essence of free will, under Compatibilism, is not the ability to have chosen otherwise in an absolute sense, but rather the ability to act according to one’s own desires, intentions, and reasoning processes without external coercion. This perspective maintains that freedom is found in voluntary action, guided by an agent’s internal states, even if those states themselves are the product of natural causal chains.
The ‘intentional stance’, as developed by Dennett, offers a useful paradigm for discussing free will within a deterministic framework. The intentional stance involves explaining and predicting behaviour by attributing beliefs, desires, and rationality to agents, regardless of the underlying physical or mechanical processes driving those behaviours. This approach operates at a higher, more abstract level of explanation, allowing us to discuss decisions, intentions, and moral responsibility in meaningful terms, even if these are underpinned by (usually unknown in detail) deterministic processes.
Reinterpreting Molinist Concepts within a Compatibilist Framework
By adopting the intentional stance, Molinist concepts such as natural knowledge, middle knowledge, and free knowledge can be reinterpreted in a way that is consistent with Compatibilism. This reinterpretation does not merely preserve Molinism but enriches it by providing a framework where divine omniscience and human freedom coexist harmoniously in a determined world.
‘Natural Knowledge’, in traditional Molinism, refers to God’s knowledge of all possible truths and scenarios independent of His will. This includes the knowledge of all possible worlds and the different ways creatures might act under various circumstances. Within a Compatibilist framework, natural knowledge remains fundamentally the same. God’s knowledge encompasses all logical and metaphysical possibilities, including every conceivable deterministic framework that could govern the universe. This means that God knows all potential configurations of the universe, the laws of nature that would apply, and the outcomes they would produce.
‘Middle Knowledge’ is where the most significant reinterpretation occurs. Traditionally, middle knowledge is God’s knowledge of what free creatures would do in any given circumstance, assuming libertarian free will. In a Compatibilist framework, however, middle knowledge can be understood as God’s knowledge of what agents would do in any given circumstance based on their determined desires, beliefs, and intentions. This knowledge is not about metaphysical possibilities in an undetermined sense but about knowing exactly how these internal states — shaped by prior causes — interact with external circumstances to produce specific actions.
In this reinterpretation, God’s middle knowledge still involves knowledge of counterfactuals, but these counterfactuals are understood within the bounds of determinism. God knows, for example, that if a person with a certain set of desires and beliefs were placed in a particular situation, they would act in a specific way. This knowledge is analogous to how a perfect psychologist might predict behaviour based on a deep understanding of a person’s psychological makeup and the external factors influencing them. The key difference is that God’s knowledge is infinitely more precise, encompassing every possible detail of every potential scenario.
‘Free Knowledge’, the third component of Molinist knowledge, remains largely the same in a Compatibilist framework. Free knowledge refers to God’s knowledge of the actual world, the one He chose to actualize from among the many possibilities He considered.
After considering all possible deterministic scenarios (through middle knowledge), God actualizes the world that best fulfils His purposes. In this world, human beings make choices consistent with their desires and intentions—choices that are determined yet voluntary, and thus meaningful in the context of Compatibilist free will.
Implications for Divine Knowledge, Sovereignty, and Moral Responsibility
Reinterpreting Molinism within Compatibilism has significant implications for our understanding of divine knowledge, sovereignty, and human moral responsibility.
‘Divine omniscience’ is preserved and even deepened in this framework. God possesses exhaustive knowledge of all possible and actual events, including every detail of every possible deterministic world. His knowledge encompasses all causal relationships and the resulting behaviours of agents, which He can predict with perfect accuracy. This knowledge does not require indeterminacy, to be meaningful; instead, it reflects God’s complete understanding of how every part of His creation functions within the laws He established.
‘Divine sovereignty’ is also maintained in this model. God’s omnipotence is expressed through His ability to actualize any possible world, choosing the initial conditions and laws that lead to outcomes aligning with His divine purposes.
Sovereignty here does not imply micromanaging every event but rather setting the parameters and initial conditions in a way that ensures His will is ultimately fulfilled. In this sense, God’s choice of which world to actualize reflects His wisdom and goodness, as He selects from among all possible deterministic scenarios the one that best accomplishes His purposes.
Human ‘moral responsibility’ remains intact in a Compatibilist framework. Even though human actions are determined by prior causes, they are still considered free in the sense that they are voluntary and aligned with the agent’s desires and intentions. The intentional stance supports the attribution of praise and blame, as it allows us to talk meaningfully about choices, decisions, and responsibilities, even in a deterministic universe. Therefore, God’s judgement and moral order remain coherent, as they are based on agents acting according to their desires and intentions, making them responsible for their actions.
Addressing Challenges: The Problem of Evil and Divine Freedom
While this Compatibilist reframing of Molinism offers a coherent and philosophically robust model, it is not without its challenges. Two significant issues are the ‘problem of evil’ and concerns about ‘divine freedom’.
‘The problem of evil’ is often cited as a major challenge to theistic belief. If God actualizes a determined world, how can He not be responsible for the evil that occurs within it? In response, Compatibilist Molinism can argue that God permits the existence of evil as part of a broader plan that ultimately brings about greater goods. For instance, challenges, suffering, and moral dilemmas can contribute to moral development, compassion, and the deepening of relationships. While agents perform evil acts according to their desires and intentions, making them morally responsible, God’s foreknowledge and sovereignty ensure that even these acts are integrated into a purposeful narrative that contributes optimally to the fulfilment of His ultimate plan.
‘Divine freedom’ is another area of concern. If determinism limits possible outcomes, is God’s choice constrained? The Compatibilist Molinist response would argue that God’s freedom is expressed in His ability to select from an immense array of possible deterministic worlds. Each possible world presents different initial conditions and outcomes, and God’s choice reflects His perfect wisdom and goodness. While determinism dictates the course of events within any given world, the range of possible worlds remains vast and varied, allowing God to exercise true freedom in choosing which world to actualize.
Conclusion: The Coherence and Advantages of Compatibilist Molinism
To summarise the essential core of Compatibilist Molinism:
1. God's Control Over Possible Worlds: God has the power to determine the initial conditions, natural laws, and other factors that shape the possible evolution of the world. This results in a "space of possible worlds," each representing a different potential reality.
2. Compatibilist Free Will within Worlds: In each possible world, agents possess Compatibilist free will. This means that while their choices are determined by prior causes (such as their desires, beliefs, and intentions), they are still considered free in the sense that they act according to their own internal motivations without external coercion, perceiving themselves not be be solely determined by underlying laws of nature.
3. God's Evaluation and Actualization of the Optimal World: God can evaluate the outcomes across the space of possible worlds, considering how the determined actions of free agents will play out within each scenario. Based on this evaluation, God chooses to actualise the world that best aligns with His desired outcomes, whatever those may be (e.g., maximising good, fulfilling a divine plan, etc.).
This framework attempts to reconcile divine sovereignty and omniscience with human freedom, aligning Molinism with a Compatibilist understanding of free will.
I found this level of analysis by the latest incarnation of ChatGPT extremely impressive. But what would John Dominic Crossan make of all this abstract discussion? I asked ChatGPT:
"Crossan might very well view the debate over Compatibilism and Molinism as somewhat disconnected from what he considers the core of Christian faith — namely, the life, teachings, and example of Jesus.
"He might argue that such mediaeval-style scholastic theological discussions, while intellectually stimulating, risk becoming overly abstract and removed from the lived experience and practical implications of following Jesus.
"In his view, the essence of Christianity lies in imitating Jesus's actions, embodying his message of love, justice, and compassion, and addressing the pressing social issues of the day."
