Wednesday, September 18, 2019

“Metaphorical Worlds Interpretation” (Chad Orzel)

Amazon link

I bought this a couple of weeks ago (Kindle) but it still sits in my stack. Soon!

Peter Woit has this post today, however, where he links to a piece by Chad Orzel.

Orzel thinks there is a better way to think about the "Many Worlds Interpretation":
"The problematic aspect here is that the wavefunction of the universe has everything in complicated superposition states, but when we select out a tiny piece of it as our system of interest, we often see that system only in single states, not a superposition of multiple states. The question that’s too often un-asked, though is: What measurement would you do to demonstrate that your system is really in a superposition?

The answer to this doesn’t need to be a procedure specific enough to actually do the experiment; a general outline would be sufficient. And, in fact, we have a couple of centuries of experience at doing exactly this: When we want to show that something has been in two states at the same time, we do an interference experiment. We put our system of interest in a superposition of two states, arrange for those two states to evolve at slightly different rates for some time, and then bring them back together and measure the final state.

If a superposition exists, there will be some oscillation in the probability of a given final state that depends on the differential evolution in the middle. This takes lots of forms– if the two states of the superposition correspond to passing through spatially separated slits, it’ll show up as an interference fringe pattern in space; if they’re two states of a cesium atom in an atomic clock, it’ll show up as a varying probability of ending up in one of those states as you adjust the frequency of your microwave oscillator.

In every case, though, you’re measuring a probability. And not even a Bayesian can accurately measure a probability from a single experiment. To get a good measurement of a probability of some outcome– let alone the variation in probability that is the signature of a superposition state– you need a large number of repeated measurements. And those measurements have to be made under the same conditions every time.

That’s the key feature that lets you carve out some parts of the giant wavefunction of the universe and choose to treat them as systems in definite states, while others need to be treated as full quantum superpositions. The vast majority of the universe that we’re bracketing off as “the environment” affects the measurement conditions, which changes the probabilities you’re measuring.

If the interaction with the environment is small, though, you can ensure that the conditions are close to identical for enough trials to unambiguously see the changing probabilities that show a superposition exists. That subpart of the universal wavefunction needs to be dealt with as a fully quantum system.

If the interaction with the environment is strong and poorly controlled, though, the conditions of your measurement change enough from one repetition to the next that you’re not really doing the same measurement multiple times. If you could know the full state of the environment for a given trial, you would predict one probability, but knowing the full state of the environment for the next trial would lead you to predict a different probability.

In the absence of that knowledge, adding together repeated results just gets you junk– you won’t see a clear dependence on the different evolution of the different states in the superposition, because it’s swamped by the unknown effect of the environment. If you can’t see the interference effect, that system “looks classical,” and you can treat it as having a definite state.

That process of interaction with the changing state of an unknown environment gets the name “decoherence,” and it’s what enables the bookkeeping trick that lets us split off pieces of the wavefunction and consider them in isolation. If the piece you’re interested in is big enough and interacts with the environment strongly enough, there’s no hope of doing the interference measurement that would show it’s in a superposition state. If you can’t do a measurement that would show the existence of the other piece(s) of the superposition, you can safely treat it as being in a single definite state.

It should be emphasized, though, that this is just bookkeeping, not a real separation between “copies of the universe,” or even copies of the system of interest. There’s only one universe, in an indescribably complex superposition, and we’re choosing to carve out a tiny piece of it, and describe it in a simplified way.

It’s not even true, strictly speaking, that the results of a given experiment for a particular object are unaffected by the presence of the other parts of the superposition for that specific object. If you could do the full probability calculation for the whole wavefunction, including all of “the environment,” the probability you would predict for that experiment would include a contribution from all the various states that are superposed. In the absence of that complete knowledge, though, you can get away with ignoring them, because you’ll never be able to repeat the measurements in the way you would need to see the influence.
...
Rather than “Many-Worlds Interpretation,” I’d go with “Metaphorical Worlds Interpretation,” to reflect the fact that all the different ways of cutting up the wavefunction into sub-parts are fundamentally a matter of convenience, a choice to talk about pieces of the wavefunction as if they were separate, because the whole is too vast to comprehend."
Peter Woit likes this story. What do you think?

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What is decoherence? Read this.

9 comments:

  1. I think I prefer this version from Orzel:

    https://www.forbes.com/sites/chadorzel/2016/01/05/what-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-physics-really-means/#7aca38941102

    I take what he's saying here is that in the Schrodinger's cat experiment:

    1) There literally are two versions of Schrodinger's conscious experience at the end of the experiment - one happy and one sad.

    2) This can be described as "two worlds"

    3) You can't take the "world" part of that description too literally. Trying to reason from just from the description (and not from the math) will lead you the wrong way.

    Ya? Though if I am right - I'm not sure why Woit would like Orzel's post, as I take Woit as vehemently denying 1)...or at least vehementently not endorsing 1).

    As per:

    https://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=11128

    Also maybe this one for maybe more clarification on Orzel's position, though it's still a little murky to me:

    https://www.forbes.com/sites/chadorzel/2019/09/11/what-ive-changed-my-mind-about-in-physics/#39b88aad6d1b

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  2. Thanks. I'll get around to checking out your links. Appreciate the comment.

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    1. OK. I read the articles at your links. They're all interesting and mostly amplify Orzel's points quoted in the post. I do think he's on to something: I wish I had been presented with this stuff in my own QM course. Thanks for commenting so usefully.

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    2. Looking at the most recent post that you quote from above, I would conclude that Orzel doesn't believe #1 from my list.

      But looking at his earlier posts that I linked to, I would instead conclude that he *does* believe #1 from my list.

      I notice that in the twitter thread that Woit links to about Many Cakes - Orzel again doesn't plainly say what he believes when questioned by Philip Ball.

      So what do you think Orzel's real position is?

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    3. Not sure. I imagine it's evolving! I sometimes think a proper theory of quantum gravity is a necessary precursor to really understanding these isssues.

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  3. I read the Carroll book last week and I have considered writing a review. I see though that Bee has also intended to write one; and now you will probably write one. The book isn't too technical.

    So far Blog comments about the Carroll book tend to be about (the commenter's view of) "Many Worlds" rather than the Carroll book itself. I have found a couple of misprints in the book, that caused a slight confusion: I should find somewhere to point them out.

    Carroll argues that there could just be a finite number of such many worlds. Carroll's primary approach to these matters is as a Cosmologist where "Observers" and "Collapse" are harder to justify and the concept of a "Universal Wave Function" is made to seem natural. In physics textbooks and courses it has been "Systems" and "Experiments" that have wavefunctions, but wider extrapolations are avoided.

    I am trying to follow up on a "Mathematical Multiverse" (actually "Computational Multiverse") idea of my own. Whether this is valid and whether it links to these physics ideas (Deutsch would be the first point of contact) remains to be seen.

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    1. A lot of physicists seem attracted to the idea of the universe as a Turing machine. I see the lure of this finite and 'constructable' ontology. Don't see how it can be made coherent with either the Lorentz transformation or QM. Seems like you lock in absolute space and time when you conceptualise the universe as [0, f(0), f(f(0)), ...].

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  4. [Previous reply lost by Bing]

    There is some distance to travel to get from [0,f(0),f(f(0)), …] to space and time. At best it is a kind of Newtonian approximation of the Environment structure possibly suitable for initial development of Agent theory.

    Introducing a second environment/agent gives us: [0,f(0),f(f(0)), …] and [0,g(0),g(g(0)), …]. This introduces a new emergent feature namely "relative rate" r. We need not assume that r=1. Introducing three agent/environments gives us three relative rates: r12, r23, r31 which ought to be inter-consistent.

    We also have the question of the type of number that r is: natural, rational, computable real, real? With at least a computable real we can end up with a "singularity" in the model because one agent cannot model the other agents past a certain point. This becomes important if these agents are meant to be communicating and behaving in a communication-dependent way: did agent 1 learn X before action Ax? If not then agent 1 has not been properly modelled by the other agents. "Before" and "After" gets caught up in computational decidability questions (as seen by the other agents trying to model what is going on).

    We can turn r into a function, so one agent could solve time complexity problems for the other agents.

    I looked at this a few years ago, but it is not the most recent ideas on the Computational Multiverse. Here we ask what is a "Turing machine" when the logic is non-classical. It turns out that "Arithmetic" changes the logic is non-classical.

    You may also know that the Real Number line (and hence the Continuum) changes when the logic is non-classical - it has even been suggested that it becomes a kind of Treacle....

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    1. On "A lot of physicists are attracted to the idea of the Universe as a Turing Machine".

      I haven't surveyed that literature especially, but there are probably two converging lines of argumentation.

      (1) The naïve assumption that the mathematical physics is computable, and so perhaps there is some Turing Machine underneath.

      (2) The more active work on Quantum Computation. Here the argument might be that the Universe is a Quantum Computer. Now David Deutsch, although criticising most of Turing's ideas, does not actually claim that a Quantum Computer is different from a Turing machine (or perhaps there is some lingering equivocation). Thus the Universe gets modelled by a Turing Machine, and via Quantum Computation, actually is a Turing Machine.

      Now these arguments leave lots of details unexamined. In case (1) we can ask: "Is this a single mainframe or a distributed system (subject to Relativity)?

      In case (2) we are dealing with Quantum Mechanics as the intermediator, which with a Universal Psi and long range entanglement is not thoroughly manifestly relativistic itself. It seems that MWI can dodge Bell's Theorem and EPR, but not everyone I read accepts that it does so in a consistent way.

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