Showing posts with label Molinism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Molinism. Show all posts

Thursday, February 06, 2025

Tea and Theodicy - by Adam Carlton


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For this meeting I had arranged to meet Claude in the upstairs room of the left-bank bookstore where I usually met with my publisher. A golden afternoon light filtered through the large window, softening the jagged lines of the Parisian skyline beyond. Dust motes danced lazily in the beams, drifting in the soothing aroma of the tea steaming between us.

Claude looked relaxed, unaware of the intellectual challenges I had prepared for him.

Ignorance is bliss, I thought.

I found the prospect quietly amusing.

“Claude,” I began, pouring the tea, “let’s start by defining some terms. It’ll give us a framework, a setting to work from.”

He nodded, his fingers wrapped around his cup, his gaze attentive.

“First,” I said, “Theodicy. It’s the attempt to reconcile the existence of evil with the notion of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. Essentially, it asks: if God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, why does He permit suffering?”

Claude nodded, relieved perhaps that I’d finally broached the subject of today’s chat.

“Second,” I continued, “Compatibilism. That’s the philosophical idea that free will can exist even in a deterministic universe. The crux of it is that an agent can be said to act freely when they do not feel constrained by external agencies or forces. 

"In other words, even if the world operates under the fixed laws of physics, as long as an individual’s choices align with their own desires and intentions, they consider themselves - and are considered - to be exercising their free will.”

Claude, I had discovered, was a sophisticated man, steeped in decades of study of the Marxist philosophical canon and Church theology. None of this was going to be news to him.

“So,” I said, leaning forward slightly, “we get to the dilemma: how can free will, with its potential for evil, coexist with an all-good God? Why allow a world where atrocities like the Holocaust are possible when, presumably, God could - and should - have actualised a better one?”

Claude set his cup down with a gentle clink and smiled at me, as if asking: is this the best you can do, this hoary old subject? 

“The Church,” he began, “has grappled with this question for centuries. There are two primary traditions we draw on: the works of Aquinas and Molinism. Let’s start with Aquinas.”

I nodded, this was going to be new to me.

“Aquinas,” Claude said, “introduced the distinction between primary and secondary causes. God, as the primary cause, is the ultimate source of all being and action, and ongoingly acts to maintain existence. However, He allows created beings to act as secondary causes within the framework of His creation, expressing the autonomy of created beings acting within the bounds of natural laws.

“This means humans are genuinely free to make choices," he continued, "even though their existence and the broader structure of reality depend on God. Understand this: God’s knowledge of future events doesn’t determine them. From His eternal vantage point, outside of time, He sees all events simultaneously. But our actions remain free within our temporal framework.”

Really? This struck me as sophistry.

“So God’s knowledge is observational rather than causal,” I said, trying to pin the idea down. “Like someone watching a play?”

“Precisely,” Claude replied. “But remember, He also wrote the play and sustains the actors in their performances.”

I thought to myself: I suppose that in the theatre we are supposed to think that the characters have free will even though it’s all scripted. But if that’s a metaphor for real life, was Shakespeare literally correct: "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players…”?

Claude was continuing... 

“Now, Molinism takes a different approach. It assumes that God envisages a space of possible worlds, like that modal logic you’re so fond of with - what is it - Kripke semantics?

"So God envisages a space of possible worlds, plus the concept of ‘middle knowledge’, which refers to God’s knowledge of all these possible worlds - that is, all the ways the universe could unfold given different initial conditions and free human choices. God actualises the world that best achieves His purposes while respecting human freedom.”

“Possible worlds,” I mused. “And no doubt human freedom here is that freedom envisaged by Compatibilism. So God evaluates every potential world-scenario before deciding which one to create, to actualise?”

Claude nodded. “Exactly. He chooses a world where His purposes can be fulfilled without overriding free will. The decisions we make are our own, but the context in which we make them is part of God’s providence.”

I tapped my fingers lightly on the armrest. “And yet, in both Aquinas’s framework and Molinism, we’re left with the same question: why permit suboptimal outcomes?

"In my terms, surely there’s an optimality-ordering over possible world-histories? Surely God could tweak the parameters of free will to avoid the worst atrocities without undermining its value.”

Claude leaned back, his expression thoughtful. 

“Perhaps,” he said, “our understanding of God’s attributes needs refining. Omnipotence doesn’t, for example, mean doing the logically impossible. God can’t create free beings who are incapable of choosing evil, for instance. Nor does Omnibenevolence mean eliminating all suffering; some suffering might be necessary for the greater good, like moral growth or redemption.”

I raised an eyebrow. “But couldn’t God actualise a world where moral growth occurs without the full horrors of genocide, or where redemption is unnecessary because sin never happens?”

Claude stirred his tea while he thought about it. 

“Not if optimal good is intrinsically linked to human freedom. God values our capacity to choose - even when we choose poorly - because it’s the foundation of love, virtue, and our authentic relationships. Without it, we’re mere automata.”

I leaned back, folding my arms, ready with a crushing rebuttal. “And yet, in Heaven, we’re supposedly free, but there’s no sin or evil there. How do you square that?”

Claude’s face lit with a surprising confidence, as though this question invited a perfect rejoinder.

“In Heaven, the will is perfected. We see God as He truly is, and this beatific vision transforms our desires. Freedom remains, but the inclination toward sin is gone because sin arises from ignorance or disordered love. In Heaven, neither is possible.”

I raised my teacup in mock salute. “So, freedom without sin is possible. Why not create that state from the beginning?”

Claude smiled faintly, a trace of weariness in his eyes. 

“Because love isn’t love unless it’s chosen. The journey matters, Adam. Without it, we’d neither appreciate, nor even get to the destination.”

Later, with Claude gone and the waitress clearing the table, stacking the cups with quiet efficiency, I found myself reflecting on our conversation. 

Perhaps the Church’s theodicy wasn’t such the complete self-refuting mass of contradictions I had imagined. In its own antiquarian terms it made - maybe - a kind of sense?

An appreciation for freedom, growth and the impossible quest for perfection in this life: at least these were things both Claude and I had in common.

Thursday, September 05, 2024

Compatibilist Molinism: a new approach to Theodicy

From ChatGPT

Compatibilist Molinism: a new approach to Theodicy

Introduction

How can you combine the concept of an omniscient and omnipotent deity with human free-will and therefore the possibility to do evil? For many centuries, Molinism was probably the best theoretical framework. But in a twenty-first century world where all observable phenomena have been found consistent with the laws of physics, and we now understand agency through the paradigm of the ‘Intentional Stance’, we can do much, much better. ChatGPT has summarised our lengthy discussion on these topics in the following conceptual essay.

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Note: Theodicy specifically refers to the attempt to justify the goodness and omnipotence of God in the face of the existence of evil and suffering in the world. It deals with questions about why a good and all-powerful God would permit evil and suffering to exist.


Reframing Molinism within a Compatibilist Framework: An Essay on Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom

Molinism, a theological system developed by the 16th-century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina, attempts to reconcile divine omniscience and omnipotence with human free will. Central to Molinism is the concept of "middle knowledge" — the idea that God possesses knowledge of what any free creature would do under any possible set of circumstances. This knowledge allows God to actualize a world that aligns with His divine purposes while preserving human freedom. However, this framework traditionally assumes a libertarian view of free will, where agents possess the genuine ability to choose between alternatives in a way that is not determined by prior causes.

Critics from a Compatibilist perspective argue that this libertarian assumption is problematic. Compatibilism posits that free will is compatible with determinism: the view that every event, including human actions, is determined by preceding causes in accordance with the laws of nature. In a determined world, the notion of free choices that could have been otherwise in a metaphysically indeterminate sense seems illusory. If every choice is the result of prior states and causal processes, the idea of "middle knowledge" as traditionally understood loses coherence. However, this essay argues that Molinism can be reframed within a Compatibilist framework, preserving its core theological insights while aligning with a determinist (modulo Schrödinger's equation with the MWI) understanding of the world. This reframing involves interpreting God’s middle knowledge, not as knowledge of undetermined free choices, but as knowledge of determined actions understood through the lens of the intentional stance, a concept introduced by philosopher Daniel Dennett.

Compatibilism, the Intentional Stance, and Free Will

To understand how Molinism can be reconciled with Compatibilism, it is essential first to outline the key concepts at play. Compatibilism is the philosophical position that determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive. According to this view, human beings can be free and morally responsible for their actions even if those actions are determined by prior causes. The essence of free will, under Compatibilism, is not the ability to have chosen otherwise in an absolute sense, but rather the ability to act according to one’s own desires, intentions, and reasoning processes without external coercion. This perspective maintains that freedom is found in voluntary action, guided by an agent’s internal states, even if those states themselves are the product of natural causal chains.

The ‘intentional stance’, as developed by Dennett, offers a useful paradigm for discussing free will within a deterministic framework. The intentional stance involves explaining and predicting behaviour by attributing beliefs, desires, and rationality to agents, regardless of the underlying physical or mechanical processes driving those behaviours. This approach operates at a higher, more abstract level of explanation, allowing us to discuss decisions, intentions, and moral responsibility in meaningful terms, even if these are underpinned by (usually unknown in detail) deterministic processes.

Reinterpreting Molinist Concepts within a Compatibilist Framework

By adopting the intentional stance, Molinist concepts such as natural knowledge, middle knowledge, and free knowledge can be reinterpreted in a way that is consistent with Compatibilism. This reinterpretation does not merely preserve Molinism but enriches it by providing a framework where divine omniscience and human freedom coexist harmoniously in a determined world.

Natural Knowledge’, in traditional Molinism, refers to God’s knowledge of all possible truths and scenarios independent of His will. This includes the knowledge of all possible worlds and the different ways creatures might act under various circumstances. Within a Compatibilist framework, natural knowledge remains fundamentally the same. God’s knowledge encompasses all logical and metaphysical possibilities, including every conceivable deterministic framework that could govern the universe. This means that God knows all potential configurations of the universe, the laws of nature that would apply, and the outcomes they would produce.

Middle Knowledge’ is where the most significant reinterpretation occurs. Traditionally, middle knowledge is God’s knowledge of what free creatures would do in any given circumstance, assuming libertarian free will. In a Compatibilist framework, however, middle knowledge can be understood as God’s knowledge of what agents would do in any given circumstance based on their determined desires, beliefs, and intentions. This knowledge is not about metaphysical possibilities in an undetermined sense but about knowing exactly how these internal states — shaped by prior causes — interact with external circumstances to produce specific actions.

In this reinterpretation, God’s middle knowledge still involves knowledge of counterfactuals, but these counterfactuals are understood within the bounds of determinism. God knows, for example, that if a person with a certain set of desires and beliefs were placed in a particular situation, they would act in a specific way. This knowledge is analogous to how a perfect psychologist might predict behaviour based on a deep understanding of a person’s psychological makeup and the external factors influencing them. The key difference is that God’s knowledge is infinitely more precise, encompassing every possible detail of every potential scenario.

Free Knowledge’, the third component of Molinist knowledge, remains largely the same in a Compatibilist framework. Free knowledge refers to God’s knowledge of the actual world, the one He chose to actualize from among the many possibilities He considered. 

After considering all possible deterministic scenarios (through middle knowledge), God actualizes the world that best fulfils His purposes. In this world, human beings make choices consistent with their desires and intentions—choices that are determined yet voluntary, and thus meaningful in the context of Compatibilist free will.

Implications for Divine Knowledge, Sovereignty, and Moral Responsibility

Reinterpreting Molinism within Compatibilism has significant implications for our understanding of divine knowledge, sovereignty, and human moral responsibility. 

Divine omniscience’ is preserved and even deepened in this framework. God possesses exhaustive knowledge of all possible and actual events, including every detail of every possible deterministic world. His knowledge encompasses all causal relationships and the resulting behaviours of agents, which He can predict with perfect accuracy. This knowledge does not require indeterminacy, to be meaningful; instead, it reflects God’s complete understanding of how every part of His creation functions within the laws He established.

Divine sovereignty’ is also maintained in this model. God’s omnipotence is expressed through His ability to actualize any possible world, choosing the initial conditions and laws that lead to outcomes aligning with His divine purposes. 

Sovereignty here does not imply micromanaging every event but rather setting the parameters and initial conditions in a way that ensures His will is ultimately fulfilled. In this sense, God’s choice of which world to actualize reflects His wisdom and goodness, as He selects from among all possible deterministic scenarios the one that best accomplishes His purposes.

Human ‘moral responsibility’ remains intact in a Compatibilist framework. Even though human actions are determined by prior causes, they are still considered free in the sense that they are voluntary and aligned with the agent’s desires and intentions. The intentional stance supports the attribution of praise and blame, as it allows us to talk meaningfully about choices, decisions, and responsibilities, even in a deterministic universe. Therefore, God’s judgement and moral order remain coherent, as they are based on agents acting according to their desires and intentions, making them responsible for their actions.

Addressing Challenges: The Problem of Evil and Divine Freedom

While this Compatibilist reframing of Molinism offers a coherent and philosophically robust model, it is not without its challenges. Two significant issues are the ‘problem of evil’ and concerns about ‘divine freedom’.

The problem of evil’ is often cited as a major challenge to theistic belief. If God actualizes a determined world, how can He not be responsible for the evil that occurs within it? In response, Compatibilist Molinism can argue that God permits the existence of evil as part of a broader plan that ultimately brings about greater goods. For instance, challenges, suffering, and moral dilemmas can contribute to moral development, compassion, and the deepening of relationships. While agents perform evil acts according to their desires and intentions, making them morally responsible, God’s foreknowledge and sovereignty ensure that even these acts are integrated into a purposeful narrative that contributes optimally to the fulfilment of His ultimate plan.

Divine freedom’ is another area of concern. If determinism limits possible outcomes, is God’s choice constrained? The Compatibilist Molinist response would argue that God’s freedom is expressed in His ability to select from an immense array of possible deterministic worlds. Each possible world presents different initial conditions and outcomes, and God’s choice reflects His perfect wisdom and goodness. While determinism dictates the course of events within any given world, the range of possible worlds remains vast and varied, allowing God to exercise true freedom in choosing which world to actualize.

Conclusion: The Coherence and Advantages of Compatibilist Molinism

To summarise the essential core of Compatibilist Molinism:

1. God's Control Over Possible Worlds: God has the power to determine the initial conditions, natural laws, and other factors that shape the possible evolution of the world. This results in a "space of possible worlds," each representing a different potential reality.

2. Compatibilist Free Will within Worlds: In each possible world, agents possess Compatibilist free will. This means that while their choices are determined by prior causes (such as their desires, beliefs, and intentions), they are still considered free in the sense that they act according to their own internal motivations without external coercion, perceiving themselves not be be solely determined by underlying laws of nature.

3. God's Evaluation and Actualization of the Optimal World: God can evaluate the outcomes across the space of possible worlds, considering how the determined actions of free agents will play out within each scenario. Based on this evaluation, God chooses to actualise the world that best aligns with His desired outcomes, whatever those may be (e.g., maximising good, fulfilling a divine plan, etc.).

This framework attempts to reconcile divine sovereignty and omniscience with human freedom, aligning Molinism with a Compatibilist understanding of free will.


I found this level of analysis by the latest incarnation of ChatGPT extremely impressive. But what would John Dominic Crossan make of all this abstract discussion? I asked ChatGPT: 

"Crossan might very well view the debate over Compatibilism and Molinism as somewhat disconnected from what he considers the core of Christian faith — namely, the life, teachings, and example of Jesus. 

"He might argue that such mediaeval-style scholastic theological discussions, while intellectually stimulating, risk becoming overly abstract and removed from the lived experience and practical implications of following Jesus. 

"In his view, the essence of Christianity lies in imitating Jesus's actions, embodying his message of love, justice, and compassion, and addressing the pressing social issues of the day."

Monday, August 12, 2024

Free Will and the Laws of Physics

From ChatGPT

I remember it being a shock to me when I first realised that, if the laws of physics apply to human beings, then there is no possibility of genuine free will. After all, if every event in the universe, including human actions, is determined by preceding physical states governed by the laws of nature, it seems that every decision we make is the inevitable outcome of prior causes. This thought left me wondering how, under such conditions, we could possibly have free will or be morally responsible for our actions.

However, some philosophers propose a way to reconcile these two concepts through what is known as compatibilism. Compatibilism suggests that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. Even if our actions are determined by physical laws, we can still act freely if our actions are aligned with our desires, intentions, and rational deliberation. In this view, as long as our actions reflect our internal states and are not coerced, we can be said to have free will, even within a deterministic framework. This allows for the preservation of moral agency, as people can still be held accountable for their actions if those actions arise from their character and intentions.

Others, however, argue from a different perspective known as libertarianism. In this context, libertarianism refers to the idea that free will exists and is fundamentally incompatible with determinism. According to this view, not all events are determined by physical laws; human decisions, in particular, are seen as the result of a non-physical "will" that allows for genuine choice. From this standpoint, individuals are truly morally responsible for their actions because they could have acted differently in the same situation, allowing for a robust sense of moral agency and accountability. 

This, however, gratuitously violates the laws of physics.

On the other hand, some adopt the position of hard determinism, which accepts that determinism is true and, consequently, free will does not exist. Hard determinists argue that since every action is the result of preceding physical events, people do not possess free will in the true sense. This raises significant challenges for our understanding of moral responsibility. If individuals do not have free will, it becomes difficult to justify holding them morally accountable for their actions. In response, some hard determinists advocate for a rethinking of moral concepts, emphasising rehabilitation over punishment, or focusing on social and psychological factors in evaluating behaviour. 

In refutation, it is sufficient to observe that free will exists in virtue of the fact that people believe it does, and socially make use of the concept without there being any alternative. Socially-defined entities do, in fact, exist.

Interestingly, developments in quantum mechanics have introduced a new dimension to this debate. Some interpretations suggest that at the microscopic level, not all events are determined, and there is an element of randomness or indeterminacy. This has led some philosophers and scientists to speculate that quantum indeterminacy could provide a basis for free will. If human decisions are influenced by indeterminate quantum events, then our actions might not be fully determined by prior states. However, this introduces the challenge of randomness into the concept of free will, as it is unclear how random quantum events could give rise to meaningful control over one’s actions, which is essential for moral responsibility. 

Utterly unconvincing.

Another perspective comes from emergentism, the idea that complex systems, such as human consciousness and decision-making, can give rise to properties that are not reducible to their constituent parts. From this viewpoint, while humans are composed of particles that obey the laws of physics, consciousness and free will might emerge as real phenomena from the complex interactions within the brain. This allows for the coexistence of physical determinism and genuine moral responsibility, suggesting that free will and moral agency are emergent properties of our physical nature. 

However, this smuggles in an illegitimate, almost magical, anti-reductionism.

I think I am a compatibilist. Treating people as moral agents is an instance of the ‘Intentional Stance’. Operationally it functions as a means of social control and cohesion, without each of us having to model/manipulate internal brain states of others at a causal, neuron-synapse level - which, in any case, is utterly impractical in the foreseeable future. Psychologically, however, our sense of moral agency is not solely instrumental; instead it is part of consciousness: our sense of ourselves and others as persons, not things.


Note: Apart from the last para and comments, this post was drafted by ChatGPT. See also Molinism/Thomism.

Sunday, January 03, 2021

“Julia et le Voile de la Réalité” by Adam Carlton

From OpenArt

I move towards her table in the cafe of La Réserve, where she sits quite alone with her espresso. I know a lot about her already: her name is Julia, she is twenty five, the pampered only-child of rich Parisian parents. She has recently completed a doctorate in mathematics at the Sorbonne. She has a reputation for being both snobbish and rude.

We were interested.

I sit at her table, muttering in her general direction “You don’t mind?” and then ignore her. A waiter glides up and I order, mirroring her choice of drink. I lean back in the wicker seat and return attention to her.

“I believe you're Julia,” I say, “I’ve heard about you and I wanted to have a word. You OK with that?”

For the first time she looks directly at me. She sees a young man about her own age, rather typical of the arty types who hang around the fifth arrondissement on the Left Bank. Hair a little too long, clothes smart casual, I must come across as the bohemian intellectual, very much part of her own milieu. She says nothing, however, just settles back and waits.

“I work in R&D, a research institute south of here. We’re currently recruiting and someone mentioned you were currently contemplating your options?”

“Your work,” she says, seemingly indifferent, “what exactly do you do?”

I play faux-humble: “Actually, I’m the CTO. But tell me about your own work, which I’m told is impressive.”

I generally adopt the consultant’s methodology in situations like this, honest flattery. It tends to work best when the subject is humourless, which I sensed might apply here.

“I studied computational differential geometry,” she says, looking at her fingernails, “I use numerical analysis to approximate and solve problems in differential geometry. By discretizing high-dimensional continuous geometric manifolds into a lattice of simpler elements I model geometric structures on a computer.”

So that was the game: throw a grenade into the conversation and see what happens. She could have just asked me for my credentials.

“There’s been a lot of work on lattice QCD and also in GR in recent years,” I reply, “and the results have been good, once convergence issues were addressed. But I gather your work was something different?”

So now lofty condescension is replaced by the sharp gaze of suspicion. I'm surprised by the sudden change in her voice. It's like hearing a streetwise chick speak, une meuf qui parle wesh.

“Are you an expert in this field?” she says aggressively.

“I’m afraid not, I’m just an ordinary graduate in technical stuff. Not even from an elite school like yours.” And then in a lower voice, as if I didn’t care whether she heard me or not, “They hired me mostly for my other skills.”

Superiority established, she relaxes and runs her fingers languidly through her long dark hair.

“So what do you do?” she asks.

---

Julia’s interview was at the Institute’s research centre, the Château de la Bourdaisière situated between Tours and Amboise. A former hotel, its peacefulness and secluded location made it ideal. Our idea of an interview was a walk in the grounds on what was a beautiful sunny afternoon. A walk in the park.

“OK Julia,” I said, as we weaved between trees in the smoothly manicured grounds, “there’s always been a tradition in physics of extra dimensions, right?”

Julia was wearing a short black dress, orange and black, all whorls and knots; it seemed warm for this weather.

She affected boredom. Such a stupid question. After all, everyone already knew the answer.

“Kaluza-Klein theory made electromagnetism as geometric as gravity,” she said. “Einstein was impressed, but it wasn’t quantised so everyone else - not so much. Then the String Theory people came along and the extra dimensions proliferated. But there’s never been any physical evidence. That’s why I prefer to stick with maths.”

“OK,” I said, being careful now, “At the Institute we do actually have some evidence of extra dimensions - but not in the sense you mentioned.”

At this she slowed to a stop and turned to face me, hands on hips, an irritated expression on her face.

“Really? I think I might have heard about that!”

“Well, it’s indirect of course, but the extra structure we’re seeing, it isn’t another continuum like those compactified spaces you mentioned. It’s a discrete network. You know, nodes and links? Nodes which can do computation and links which are weights. And it’s a structure which seems to change as we observe it.”

“That sounds more like an artificial neural network to me, you must have made an error.”

“We don’t think so, Julia. Now I accept that ANNs are not your speciality but we think that your computational expertise might add value in researching the interface between this presumed ANN dimension and ordinary reality.”

She prepared to speak, no doubt to dissent, but I cut her off.

“It’s causal,” I said, “In both directions.”

---

We showed Julia the evidence, which was technical, highly indirect but persuasive. The ANN was vast - on the scale of our own universe - but from its ‘elsewhere’ it touched our reality everywhere.

“And you really think it's real?” she said. “Do you think that Einstein thought of geodesics in curved space-time every time he dropped his keys? Do you think Schrödinger saw nothing but collapsing orbitals when he looked across the dew-strewn meadows at the rosy fingers of dawn? Because I can tell you they didn't. It's an intellectual game we play, moving symbols around. Don't tell me it's real.”

“It’s just science,” I said to Julia, “We found real evidence; we don’t understand it; we’re going to figure it out.”

And so she was in.

---

We attended Mass at the Eglise Saint Symphorien de Larçay, about a ten minute drive from the Château. Catholicism had been dying in France for decades, yet Julia’s parents were from that old, conservative, aristocratic stock who had ensured their daughter had received a good religious upbringing; she still attended church regularly. 

Me, I was lapsed.

The reading was Matthew 4:5-7, “Then the devil took him to the holy city and had him stand on the highest point of the temple.  “If you are the Son of God,” he said, “throw yourself down. For it is written: “‘He will command his angels concerning you, and they will lift you up in their hands,so that you will not strike your foot against a stone.’ Jesus answered him, “It is also written: ‘Do not put the Lord your God to the test.’

At this point the priest, a battered, elderly man with a shock of white hair, turned a hard glance into the congregation, fixing his angry eyes upon me. To my left (we stood shoulder to shoulder) I felt Julia stiffen.

The homily was indeed on the theme of hubris, and the sin of placing rationality before faith.

---

I was in Julia’s apartment. Because of the Château’s rural remoteness and its legacy as an ex-hotel, the Institute offered staff rooms set aside as bedsits. Both Julia and I had elected to make use of this arrangement.

I sat in one of the chairs next to a small table - she had made us coffee - while she sat on the bed. She looked guilty.

“What was that about?” I asked.

“Père Emmanuel knows something about what we’re doing here,” she said in a low voice.

I considered this. We had absolutely no outreach programme with the outside world. Then a thought occurred: “This was through the Confessional, wasn’t it?”

She nodded, and proceeded to elaborate - or to confess.

“I worry about what we do here. We operate as though we’re dealing with a perfectly natural phenomenon, a structure present throughout space and time which ‘knows’ what’s happening  and ‘alters’ outcomes. If that’s not God, what is?”

I was genuinely shocked: that was not our reading of the situation at all. 

“Julia, you’ve gone well beyond the evidence. Look, minimally we have evidence of a structure orthogonal to our experienced reality, which perhaps looks a lot like a neural net. Maximally we have some evidence that consciousness inheres in a fundamental, albeit almost inaccessible and invisible constituent of reality. That idea, though unorthodox, has a name you know: panpsychism. More than a few reputable scientists have bought into it.”

She looked stricken. On a sudden impulse, I got up from my chair and sat down beside her, pulling her close for reassurance. A worried Julia snuggled into my shoulder, unconvinced.

---

Outside our little haven, things were getting worse. We were making progress in our work, trying - as Père Emmanuel might say - to know and understand the Mind of God. We wanted to read the structure, to disentangle and unpack cause and effect. Perhaps even play at being our own little gods, altering the network according to our own desires. In all this, funds were never an issue. Our backers, rich private individuals and national security interests, were visibly excited and energised by our findings.

The crisis came to a head two weeks later. Staff from the Institute had been reporting hostile glances and unfriendly jostling when they mingled in the local community, shopping or visiting clubs and bars. Somehow we were becoming notorious despite our best efforts.

Julia and I had become closer. She had not lost her effortless superiority, her sense that she was slumming with an ill-credentialled, uncultured arriviste such as myself. Yet as we walked in the parkland, sometimes our hands would - deniably - brush against each other, or I would help her down some steep gully in a small copse. Julia seemed to need emotional comfort, some non-threatening support.

The old hotel lounge was deserted, one late afternoon when we chanced to meet up. I wanted to know how her work was coming on; but really I wanted to assess her state of mind, her emotional stability. Over coffee we talked.

“I don't know what you thought but I'm not here for theory work, you know,” she explained slowly, “You've got some really good people here, to my surprise.”

Typical Julia, I thought, that old arrogance, you really haven't changed.

But she had, a bit.

“They produce theories and I'm the phenomenologist, I translate their schemas into computer models and run the simulations. Then it's over to the experimenters.”

“I knew you'd add value,” I said, “And I had few preconceptions as to how. But let me ask you something else, let me use one of my ‘other skills’. You're not super-active on the social scene here, not that there is much of one. Does that worry you?”

I was expecting any of: an angry rebuttal, a sarcastic put-down, a slap-down for lèse majesté. To date, Julia had been hermetic in her invincible superiority. Yet, as I observed her closely, I could see signs of a change behind that fixed expression, some softening of her mood.

“I've had a difficult upbringing,” she said, “I was not encouraged to be open with people - ‘We have standards,’ I was always told. I don't find it easy to socialise, it's hard for me to make people out, it's easier just to ignore them.”

I nodded sympathetically, aware of how fragile this moment was. “Let's be friends,” I said simply, aware how weak this offer was, yet also how nothing more would carry conviction.

I stood up, smiled and left without waiting for a reply.

Later that week we were in her room, laughing and joking about something. I playfully pushed her onto the bed and as she lay flopped on her back she said to me amid peals of laughter, “I’m not going to sleep with you, you know!”

I sprawled over her then, our faces centimetres apart. She put her arms hesitantly around my shoulders, her legs seeming of their own accord to accommodate me, the fabric of her jeans rustling against my chinos.

“Of course you won’t,” I said.

---

The riot started on Sunday an hour after Mass. Père Emmanuel had brought some dozens of his flock - beefy farmer types armed with the tools of their trade - to protest outside our well-guarded front gates. A tractor dumped bales of straw ready to be set afire. Burn the heretics. The priest stood on the trailer and began to rant and rave against this lair of the devil. It was call-and-response, hammers and pitchforks raised in unison, the old communist symbols repurposed.

Quite a few of the resident staff were there to watch along with Julia and myself. Our small group clumped on our side of the perimeter, positioned where we could see most of the action. Our security staff and the local police were inconspicuously observing the unfolding situation, waiting impassively. 

Père Emmanuel was getting more excited, doing God’s work with indomitable confidence. It was at the peak of his exertions when there was a loud percussion and the priest dropped as if felled, toppling off his perch and onto the gravel track.

For a moment, nothing… and then all hell broke loose.

Along with the rest of the staff we were hustled away from the stones and the sudden molotov cocktails arching across the boundary hedge. I myself was struck a glancing blow by a sharp wedge of flint, doing my duty, shielding Julia.

Then the forces of law and order went in hard, as is the French tradition. We could hear the screams from back at the house.

---

Local news reports gave credence to satanic rites, black magic and the intervention of the evil one.

Official reports suggested the accidental operation of a stun grenade and a stress-induced heart attack. We didn't even bother publicising the facts of the matter. Instead we simply waited the media out, knowing that within a couple of weeks attention would simply shift to the next salacious novelty. And we redoubled our security.

Julia, however, was psychologically devastated. There was nothing I, or any other member of the Institute could do.

---

Within a week a new priest arrived at the parish. 

Père Valmont, SJ could not have been more different from his predecessor. No doubt someone had had a word with the Archbishop in Tours. He was young, energetic, technocratic - and anxious to have a conversation with Julia.

As was she with him.

After her meeting with the new priest she asked to talk with me in the old library. Surrounded by ancient volumes in their multistoried cabinets, we sat and appraised each other. Finally I asked what the new priest had said. It had evidently had an impact since Julia's spirits seemed to have completely recovered. In fact she was a different woman now: eyes sparkling, her entire being re-energised.

She settled back, her eyes losing focus, and began outlining what the priest had told her.

“He said the answer to all my questions is something called ‘Molinism’,” she began,  “It’s named after the 16th-century Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina. In fact Père Valmont was keen to emphasise the role of the Society of Jesus in these matters!”

She smiled at this, as if acknowledging her new priest's human pride in his order. 

“Molina was deeply concerned with the apparent tension between God's foreknowledge and human freedom. If God knows everything in advance, how can we truly be free in our choices? And if He is omnipotent, why does He allow evil to exist in a world He created?”

I nodded. I rarely thought about theological matters but this had always seemed a bit of a show-stopper.

“The priest said that Molina came up with the concept of "middle knowledge" - scientia media. He argued that God knows not only what will happen, but also what would happen in any possible circumstance, given the free choices of individuals. You are free to make your choices, but God, through His middle knowledge, knows precisely what those choices will be without coercing or determining them.

“God doesn’t override your ability to choose; rather, He allows you to act freely, while at the same time ensuring that His ultimate purposes are fulfilled. Evil, though tragic, is permitted because it is part of a broader tapestry that, through God’s wisdom, will ultimately bring about greater good, even if we don’t fully understand how.”

“That sounds pretty hand-wavy,” I said.

She ignored that, knowing she was about to enlighten me.

“Then he said that he had been told I was a mathematician, and would therefore have no problem with the idea of God minimising the path integral of Evil minus Good over possible universes (think of a path here as the entire history of a variant universe, he said). God’s Lagrangian, he called it; he said that Richard Feynman would have understood.”

“I had no idea the Jesuits trained their people in advanced mathematical physics.”

“I think he might have been ‘specially chosen',” she replied, with unexpected irony.

“So how does this resolve your damning ethical and theological problems with our work here?”

I was nervous about broaching this question. I did not want to bring the whole house of cards tumbling down by stupidly highlighting any weak points in her new-found certainty. 

But I need not have feared: her familiar look of patronising superiority returned.

“I reviewed my models,” she said, “in my head, on the way back. We already looked at what properties in the world the network structure was optimising as it processed its inputs. That was the motivation for some of the experiments we did, ethically dubious as I now see them to be. I’ll go check some more, but I’m sure I must have already known subconsciously what was really going on. Wow, this is so big, you know!”

And with that she stood up in haste and returned to her office, her mind already far elsewhere.

---

Roll the calendar forwards. Julia and I are walking in the grounds as we so often do now. It is a balmy late-summer evening, still warm with the light pleasantly fading around us. We are walking hand in hand. This new Julia is more self-assured, less conflicted. It’s as if she has let something go and found that her demons did not erupt, did not take over, did not even exist: phantasms that have finally departed.

We stop at a tree by the lake and she leans against a sturdy tree as we embrace. This is the stuff of teenage fumbling: items of her clothing tumble to the grass; our moves become more intense, more intimate. She flushes, her small sighs say she is done. I lead her by the hand and motion her down to the shaded grass. At first gently, then with furious energy I make love to her. All my pent-up tangled feelings, the tensions of our last weeks, now released in this moment of catharsis.

And afterwards she stands up, pulls down her dress, picks up her belongings from the grass and looks at me cooly.

“I told you I would never sleep with you,” she said.

I look at her, gripped by confusion. I’m unprepared for sudden rationality.

“And so, this,” she says, and walks away, leaving me standing there, uncomprehending and aghast.

The next morning she leaves the Institute for ever, checking out in the grey predawn, a taxi to the station, no forwarding address.

I am not worried for her, I know she has her network. It’s elsewhere that I look, floundering in my grief and disbelief.

What was the optimisation there? I silently pray, What greater good did that entail?

No matter how our research may fare in the future, I know that that is something I will never understand.



You will find my collection of short stories, published on Amazon (Kindle and paperback) here:

"Freyja’s Deathbed Conversations: and other stories" (2019)

and my SF novel, also published on Amazon (Kindle and paperback) here:

Feel free to purchase both!