Seismic Sensors at Fordow?

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Could Seismic Sensors Reveal the Fate of Fordow?

Could we have learned more from the tremors beneath the earth than from spies or satellites? In the aftermath of the strike on Iran’s Fordow uranium enrichment facility, a site buried deep within a mountain near Qom, that is precisely what may have happened.

Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) in the case of Fordow is no trivial exercise. The facility sits beneath 80-90 metres of rock, shielded against most conventional munitions and likely designed with internal blast-proofing. After the attack using Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs), satellite photographs showed entrance holes but nothing about whether the centrifuge halls remain intact, whether collapse has occurred, or whether radioactive material has been released.

So what else might one turn to? The answer lies in seismic waves.

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Seismic BDA: What Could Be Learned?

Seismic data offers a unique means of peering inside the mountain post-strike. Properly interpreted, it can reveal:

• Impact energy and depth of penetration
  High-frequency signatures and time-of-arrival data across a seismic network can reconstruct where the bombs struck, where they detonated within the mountain and whether any fizzled prematurely.

• Structural damage and cavity collapse
  The waveforms of collapsing chambers differ markedly from mere overpressure events. Cavity collapses produce low-frequency “coda waves” and can, with a dense enough sensor net, be located and mapped with remarkable precision.

• Presence of volatile materials
  A secondary explosion involving uranium hexafluoride or hydrogen might be inferred from anomalous acoustic or thermal signatures, distinct from high explosive alone.

• Sequencing and success/failure analysis
  Given that multiple penetrators were used, seismic data can time their impacts and effects to the second.

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Where Would the Sensors Need to Be?

To detect that something exploded, seismic stations at CENTCOM bases in Gulf states or Turkey - hundreds or thousands of kilometres away - are sufficient. The International Monitoring System routinely detects North Korean nuclear tests from across the Pacific.

But to resolve internal structure, track shockwave propagation, and identify which chambers collapsed?

That requires sensors within 1 to 10 km of the site, perhaps even closer. Ideally, a sparse seismic array would surround the facility, spaced in a horseshoe outside the most defended perimeter. The sensors need not be many - six to twelve would suffice for triangulation.

They would need to:

• Be sensitive to frequencies from 1 Hz up to 50+ Hz (for cavity resolution)

• Timestamp and locally store data with GPS precision

• Transmit data in bursts, intermittently, to evade detection

• Survive months in situ, in desert or mountain terrain

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What Kind of Sensor? Could They Be Drone-Deployed?

This is the 21st century. A full seismic node with GPS, battery, memory, satellite modem, and camouflaged casing can weigh under 2 kg. About the size of a football. The oil and gas industry deploys thousands.

Miniaturised versions - MEMS-based seismometers, used in structural monitoring - can be as small as a bar of soap. Tuck them into a rock-shaped casing, power them by solar trickle or long-life lithium, and they’ll record and report for months.

Could they be deployed by drone?

Absolutely.

A small, autonomous quadcopter or fixed-wing drone, guided by inertial navigation or terrain mapping (no GPS needed), could have flown low at night and dropped or perched these sensors within a few kilometres of Fordow. Drop mechanisms could implant them shallowly into soil or crevices. Comms could be low-power burst transmissions via satellite or data-mule drones passing overhead at prearranged times.

The whole operation could be conducted without a single Israeli or American operative setting foot in Iran.

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Has It Been Done?

We don’t know. But we do know this:

• Mossad penetrated deep into Tehran to extract nuclear archives.

• Israeli and U.S. drones operate over Iranian territory with impunity, including the famous RQ-170 Sentinel incident.

• The CIA spent decades tapping Soviet undersea cables, hiding recording pods under tonnes of seawater.

• Fordow was known, mapped, and inspected multiple times—perfect opportunities to slip a few toys in and leave them sleeping.

So when the bombs hit at Fordow, most likely some people were listening very carefully indeed.

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