Prospects for Capitalist Democracy in the US and China (2025+)

Under capitalism, 'bourgeois democracy' represents a unique historical governance model. Unlike preceding social formations, where autocratic rule prevailed for the majority even if ruling elites practiced forms of internal democracy, capitalism fundamentally separates the primary locus of economic wealth generation (the capitalist class) from direct, day-to-day control of the state apparatus.

Why is this distinction crucial?

Capitalist societies, under stable conditions, tend to reproduce themselves through economic mechanisms rather than constant, overt state coercion. Individuals generally participate in the labour market due to economic necessity and the prospect of wages, not under the direct threat of state violence, which was implicitly (and sometimes literally) the case for slaves or feudal peasants.

In periods of expansion, the inherent competitive drive of capitalism ("invest or die") fuels economic growth. When this "rising tide" genuinely lifts living standards across various classes, it fosters social stability and consent.

A democratic framework in theory allows for debate and negotiation over the optimal policies to manage the complex economic and political system. It permits the appearance of 'government by consent' and provides transparent feedback  to the governing elite. The lack of requirement for heavy coercion removes the atmosphere of pervasive fear which blights the lives of everyone under explicitly authoritarian modes of governance.

The dynamics shift dramatically when capitalist economies face serious challenges, such as prolonged stagnation, severe recession, or deep-seated inequality – conditions acutely relevant to the current situation in the United States.

While headline figures might fluctuate, significant portions of the American working and middle classes have experienced decades of wage stagnation relative to productivity gains, increased job precarity, and anxieties fueled by inflation and the rising cost of living. The promise of a consistently rising tide has faltered for many.

This economic malaise is intertwined with profound political polarisation and social friction. We see widespread "confusion and obdurate resistance" manifesting as deep distrust in institutions, political deadlock hindering effective governance, and the rise of populist movements on both the left and right. 

These movements often obstruct policy measures, whether aimed at restoring traditional capitalist profitability (which might involve austerity unpopular with the left) or addressing social inequalities (which often face resistance from the right). The strain on the US democratic system is palpable, marked by intense debates over electoral legitimacy, the functioning of democratic institutions, and increased social division.

While not yet necessitating overt authoritarian rule in the mold of historical fascism, these conditions of political deadlock create fertile ground for erosion of traditional democratic norms and heightened state responses to unrest.

Historically, severe crises have generally prompted shifts towards authoritarianism to enforce unpopular economic adjustments – mass unemployment, wage cuts, restructuring – deemed necessary by capital and the state to restore growth conditions. The examples of Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal serve as reminders that while bourgeois democracy might be the systemic "attractor" in 'normal' times, repressive regimes installed during crises can subsequently endure for generations.

The current pressures within the US highlight the fragility of democratic consent when the underlying economic bargain frays.

Systems attempting direct bureaucratic control over production through central planning have historically required significant repression. The interests of a planning bureaucracy rarely align organically with the diverse needs and desires of the broader population. Maintaining control necessitates suppressing dissent and enforcing compliance through administrative and often coercive means.

While China today isn't a purely centrally planned economy, its hybrid model, combining significant market elements with dominant strong-state direction and extensive political repression, illustrates this inherent tension. The state's pervasive control apparatus is a response to perceived weaknesses or insecurities rather than as it appears - a display of strength.

While China embraced market mechanisms extensively in recent decades leading to dramatic economic growth and the rise of a large middle class, recent years have witnessed a marked reassertion of Communist Party control over the economy and society, driven by state-elite fears of a weakening of national cohesion and vision.

The state has consequently cracked down on private sector power (particularly in tech), emphasized "common prosperity" (partly as a means to manage inequality and reassert Party legitimacy), and maintained significant influence through state-owned enterprises. The economy faces headwinds, including demographic challenges, a property sector crisis, and high youth unemployment, potentially alienating middle-class aspirations and demands.

Given China's historical anxieties about national unity and fragmentation, the leadership leverages these fears to justify intense central control. Any imagined transition towards a system resembling France or Russia seems less likely now than a continuation and hardening of the current sophisticated, tech-enabled authoritarian model under entrenched CCP rule.

While economic discontent exists, the Party's grip, combined with nationalist appeals and the lack of organized opposition, makes a fundamental political shift appear distant. The CCP is adapting its methods of managing capitalism and controlling dissent, rather than yielding to pressures for liberal democracy. Of course, there is an economic downside to such suppression of individual initiative.

The United States currently exemplifies a mature capitalist democracy under significant strain, where economic anxieties fuel political polarization and challenge institutional stability.

China, conversely, showcases a potent, adaptive authoritarian state managing a vast, partially marketised economy through sophisticated control and repression, defying earlier expectations of inevitable political liberalization driven by economic development.

The forces driving political and institutional transformation in the US and China are markedly dissimilar. However, the stresses of their rivalry accentuate the drive towards strong states, and diminish the space for the traditional weak, laissez-faire, managerial style of liberal bourgeois democracy.

Interesting times.