On Betraying Your Friends

---

Forster, Betrayal, and the Biology of Loyalty

In 1938 E. M. Forster published his short essay What I Believe. It contained the line which caused outrage at the time:

“If I had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I should have the guts to betray my country.” 

England was still a patriotic, hierarchical society. The prospect of war against Hitler made such an inversion of national loyalty appear close to treason. Forster was staking a claim: private fidelity outweighs abstract allegiance.

Biologists later gave this dilemma a technical frame. W. D. Hamilton showed that cooperation is favoured when the cost of helping (C) is outweighed by the benefit (B) to genetic relatives (r): r × B > C.

Robert Trivers extended this logic to non-kin, modelling reciprocal altruism between partners and friends who can recognise and remember each other. 

Kinship and friendship thus become the natural anchors of loyalty. Abstract entities like “nation” or “cause” are secondary. They can command devotion only when group enforcement, ideology, or reputational payoffs outweigh the immediate pull of blood and reciprocity. Symbols cement an imaginary community.

No one faced with Forster’s choice runs Hamilton's equations. Evolution equipped us with emotions to act as the compass.

• Love and attachment make betrayal of family or friends feel like a physical wound
• Fear of punishment by the wider group pulls in the opposite direction 
• Shame and guilt mark disloyalty
• pride and honour mark resistance 
• Anger, defiance, empathy, anxiety - each has its part.

These conflicting signals are not noise; they are the very mechanism by which human beings weigh such choices. There is no algorithmic outcome: it always depends.

States have long understood this emotional architecture. Coercive interrogation makes use of it. The interrogator threatens family and friends to trigger attachment and fear. He offers narratives to ease the guilt of betrayal (“your comrades abandoned you”).

The prisoner sits inside Forster’s dilemma, subject to the deliberate manipulation of an emotional pot-pourri. The choice cannot be abstract; it is staged in flesh and blood.

There is no universal answer. Sometimes loyalty to comrades or cause is held to the death; sometimes the bonds of kinship or friendship break it. Evolution has not equipped us with a single moral compass here; instead a suite of clashing emotions, each a product of selective advantage from deep history.

Forster’s provocation endures because it exposes not treachery but the brutal evolutionary truth: loyalty can never be absolute, only contextual.