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| Brexit: the fundamental issue is the UK vis-à-vis Germany |
Brexit is not hard to understand.
1. The Germans are overt players again
Germany is waking from its decades of political hibernation. Its long atonement for the crimes of Nazism. The years in which it hid pursuit of its national interests behind the EU project, passive-aggressively ceding political leadership to France.
The new emerging Germany is finally ready and willing to be the European hegemon. Ask Greece.
2. The French know their place
The French elite, under Macron, has already capitulated, providing ideological cover to the German project with its narrative of transnationalism and 'ever closer union'. It's rather like the UK relationship with the US although the French have more influence over Germany.
La France profonde is increasingly restive.
3. The British: global financial reach + indifferent regional manufacturing
The UK elite, from its vantage point of a global financial nexus, knows it could never dominate Germany in Europe. But neither does it wish to be dominated. Its European strategy has always been transactional and divisive.
4. A political UDI suits both sides in the EU
A rising Germany is happy that the UK, a game-spoiling rival, is withdrawing from the ring. The French likewise.
The more globalised, financialised UK sees a least bad outcome in maintaining optimised economic access to the European market for goods and services. The British (English? .. London?) elite is therefore broadly happy with the May government's Brexit strategy and is content to spend the next plurality of years fine-tuning it.
Despite the aspirations of UK Remainers (fans of the Macron project), there has been no concerted pressure from the major EU powers (Germany, France) for a second referendum. The 'People's Vote’ has been theatre, reflecting a lack of purchase on the core of UK elite opinion.
5. Labour should tactically prop up the May government
If Labour were smart, they would abstain on the early December parliamentary vote on the May proposals.
This would avoid complicity in the risk of an uncontrolled hard Brexit (which would dismay their Momentum base and be strongly opposed by the UK elite) while exposing May's reliance on Labour to get her own policy through.
The three-way civil war inside the Conservative party would intensify and the Tories would look even less a viable government.
6. Plus ça change ... in the short run
As the UK transitions out of the EU in March 2019, all the cans will have been kicked down the road for another few years.
The May government may well stagger on to the next election (due 2022), spinning its administrative wheels with no consensual Tory vision or roadmap whatsoever - and with Labour salivating and preparing for government.
I take it from this that you wouldn't expect a "Peoples Vote" to actually happen?
ReplyDeleteAlso the difficulty the Remainers ought to have, is that they should spell out what they actually want wrt to the EU.
Poulantzas would emphasise the relative autonomy of the state in this conjuncture. It's one thing to have an accurate analysis; another to predict the chaotic process of the forthcoming decision making.
ReplyDeleteI doubt a second referendum. May could, somehow, miraculously, win the parliamentary vote in a couple of weeks. Absent that there'll be some creative fix but it's hard to discern the outlines from here.
I still think the most likely outcome is a deal along the lines May is proposing, if only because all other options are so profoundly disfavoured by elite interests. And that includes an overt 'Remain' which is explosively destabilising given the class alignment on Brexit.
I would cite the current French protests, the 'gilets jaunes' alluded to in the post above, as supporting my final point about the dangers of a popular explosion in the event of an imposed 'Remain'.
ReplyDelete